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ST. LOUIS
LAW REVIEW
vol, vI Published by the Undergraduates of theWashington University School of Law No. 2
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON MUNICIPAL
TAXATION IN MISSOURI
A JUDICIAL STRUGGLE.
A goodly number of the best lawyers in Missouri sat in
the Convention which framed the Constitution of 1875. Yet
their work, like the Will of that other great lawyer, Samuel J.
Tilden, has been found not to be flawless. In particular, two
Sections of Article Ten have given the courts no end of
trouble. They both relate to Municipal Taxation. Section
11 classified the counties, cities and towns of the State-
the counties, according to the amount of taxable property in
each; the cities and towns according to the number of inhab-
itants in each; and it provided what should be the maximum
rate of taxation allowable for county, city, town and school
purposes, in the several municipalities, in each of these classes,
and in school districts. Section 12 regulated these municipali-
ties in the matter of incurring debts, and provided for the
levying of a tax to pay the interest and principal of every
such debt. The question that long troubled the courts was
whether the tax provided in Section 11 was the only tax that
could be levied for municipal purposes, or whether an addi-
tional tax might be levied to pay debts.
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As to counties, the provision of Section 11 is:
For county purposes, the annual rate on the property in
counties having $6,000,000 or less, shall not in the aggregate
exceed 50c on the $100 valuation; in counties having
$6,000,000 and under $10,000,000, said rate shall not exceed
40c on the $100 valuation; in counties having $10,000,000, and
under $30,000,000, said rate shall not exceed 50c on the $100
valuation, and in counties having $30,000,000 or more, said
rate shall not exceed 35c on the $100 valuation.
As to cities and towns, the provision of Section 11 was
that:
For city and town purposes, the annual rate on property
in cities and towns having 30,000 inhabitants or more, shall
not, -in the aggregate, exceed 100 cents on the $100 valuation;
in cities and towns having less than 30,000, and over 10,000
inhabitants, shall not exceed 60c on the $100 valuation; in
cities and towns having less than 10,000 and more than 1,000
inhabitants, said rate shall not exceed 50c on the 100 valuation;
and in towns having 1,000 inhabitants or less, said rate shall
not exceed 25c on the $100 valuation.
As to school districts, provision was also made for a maxi-
mum rate, which however, might be increased upon a vote
of the people. The Section closed with these words:
Said restrictions as to rates shall apply to taxes of every
kind and description, whether general or special, except taxes
to pay valid indebtedness now existing or bonds which may
be issued on renewal of such indebtedness.
Section 12 provided that no municipality should be allowed
to become indebted, in any sum beyond the income and rev-
enue of the year, without the assent of two-thirds of the quali-
fied voters, and that the amount of indebtedness that might
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be incurred should not in the aggregate exceed "five per
centum on the value of the taxable property therein."
This section closed with these words:
Any county, city, town, township, school district or other
political corporation or subdivision of the State incurring any
indebtedness requiring the assent of the voters as aforesaid
slll, before or at the time of doing so, provide for the collec-
tion of an annual tax sufficient to pay the interest on such
indebtedness as it falls due, and also to constitute a sinking
fund for payment of the principal thereof, within twenty
years from the time of contracting the same.
In 1890, Columbia was a town of about 6,000 inhabitants.
It, therefore, fell into the third class, and under Section 11,
had power to levy taxes for town purposes to the amount of
50c on the $100. In that year, after levying a tax of 50c, the
Board of town trustees passed, and the citizens at an election
duly held, by a two-thirds vote, approved an ordinance pro-
viding for the issuance of $45,000 of bonds for water-works
and electric light purposes. The ordinance provided for an
additional levy each year of 37/2c on the $100, to pay the
interest and create a sinking fund to pay the principal of these
bonds. The Prosecuting Attorney of Boone County sued
out an injunction to prevent the issue of these bonds, alleging
as a reason that the tax provided by the ordinance, was a tax
over and beyond the rate permitted by the Constitution.
The trial Court granted the injunction, and this, on appeal
to the Supreme Court, was affirmed.
State ex rel Rebinson v. Town of Columbia, 111 Mo. 365.
The opinion in this case was delivered by Judge Black,
who had been a member of the Convention of 1875. Constru-
ing Section 11, Judge Black said:
"The last clause says: 'Said restrictions as to rates shall
apply to all taxes of every kind and description, whether
general or special.' The tax which the trustees propose to
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levy to pay the interest on these bonds, and to create a
sinking fund is a special tax within the meaning of the clause
of Section 11 just quoted. It is, therefore, perfectly clear
that the annual tax to pay current expenses and to pay the
interest on these bonds, and to create a sinking fund cannot
exceed, in the aggregate, fifty cents on the $100 valuation.
Now the ordinances in this case contemplate, and indeed,
provide that this debt, evidenced by the bonds, shall be paid
by a tax additional to the levy of fifty cents on the $100 valu-
ation. To the fifty-cent tax it is proposed to add an interest
tax and a sinking-fund tax to pay the bonds, amounting to
an annual levy of at least thirty-seven and one-half cents on
the $100. As this additional tax is in excess of the constitu-
tional limit it will be illegal, and its collection may be enjoined.
Book v. Earl, 87 Mo. 246; Arnold v. Hawkins, 95 Mo. 569;
Black v. McGonigle, 103 Mo. 192.
"Nor is there anything in Section 12 which modifies the
result just stated. * * * These two sections relate to the
same subject, are consistent with each other, and they must
be construed together. They deny to towns like Columbia the
power to levy a tax exceeding fifty cents on the $100 valua-
tion for any such purpose as that contemplated by the ordi-
nances in question. As before stated, the tax to pay current
expenses and to pay this proposed waterworks and electric-
light plant debt must not, in the aggregate, exceed fifty cents
on the $100 valuation. The town has no right or power to
increase its tax levy beyond that amount for the purpose of
building waterworks or lighting the streets and highways.
Perhaps the town could pay these bonds out of the fifty-cent
tax and the revenue derived from the waterworks, but that
fact does not, nor is it claimed that it can, aid the defendants;
for the ordinances in question provide for a tax to pay the
bonds over and above the fifty-cent annual tax. The town
has no power to levy or collect such a tax.
"Although the entire indebtedness of the town, including
these proposed bonds, does not reach five per cent of the value
of the taxable property, still it is proposed to levy a tax
exceeding fifty cents on the $100. One constitutional limita-
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tion is just as binding as the other. The town will not be
tllowed to violate either. Whether the bonds, if is-ued and
.old, could or would be held payable out of the fifty-cent
tax, and, therefore, valid, is a question not discussed in the
briefs nor considered by this court. The bonds should not
be issued, under the ordinances in question, because the
ordinances provide for their payment by a tax which the
con-titution says the town cannot levy."
1 his decision was a staggering blow to the growth of the
minor cities. By denying them the power to provide them-
selves with urban tacilities, at that time becoming usual in
miny states, it tended to check the flow of population into
titese cities. Per contra, it tended to keep the rural population
at home, a beneficent result as we now realize. Perhaps it
would have been well if the decision had never been changed.
But that was not to be its fate.
About the same time that Columbia was planning her im-
provements, the City of Lamar in Barton County was like-
wise planning for herself. She was a City of 3,000 inhabitants,
was limited by Section 11 to a tax of 50c on the $100, and
wished to provide water-works. To that end, the Mayor and
Board of Aldermen, in 1890, enacted an ordinance submitting
to a vote of the people, the question whether or not the City
should enter into a contract for the construction of a system
oi water-works. The ordinance provided that the City should
rent sixty fire hydrants, for twenty years, at $50 each, per
year. To pay these rentals, the ordinance further provided
that there should be levied and collected annually, during the
twenty-year period, a tax of 40c on the $100 valuation. An
election was held, and the people, by a two-thirds vote, gave
consent, and the contract was duly entered into. The works
were constructed and put into operation, and water was fur-
nished to the City and its inhabitants for several years.
During this period, the City, for its general purposes, each
year levied a tax of 50c on the $100, and for a time a further
tax of 40c, to pay these hydrant rentals. In 1893, the City
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ceased to levy this latter tax, the rentals went unpaid, and the
Water Company sued to recover them.
Lamar Water Co. v. City of Lamar, 128 Mo. 188.
Besides other defenses not necessary to be noticed here,
the City set up in this action, that the ordinance and contract
on which it was based, were void because the tax to pay the
hydrant rentals, was and was intended to be over arid beyond
the regular 50c tax, and was therefore beyond the constitu-
tional limit. The ordinance did not state that the water tax
was intended to be an additional tax, but it was in fact so
intended, and both sides agreed in presenting the case on
that theory. The identical question decided in the Columbia
case was thus presented for re-examination. The case came
up in Division No. 1 of the Supreme Court, and Judge Black
delivered the opinion, affirming and elaborating the decision
rendered in the Columbia case. (See 128 Mo. 190-203).
The Water Company filed a motion for re-hearing. This
was overruled. But one of the Judges dissented and this
gave the Company the right to have the case transferred
from the Division to the Court en bane. Here the case was
again fully argued, the earlier decision was reversed and
the Columbia case was overruled. It thus became established
law, that a municipal corporation incurring debt, might levy
a tax to pay the debt over and above the tax permitted by
Section 11.
On behalf of the Water Company, it was contended that
this might be done, because: (1) Section 12 requires a
sufficient tax to be levied when a municipality incurs debt, and
a tax levied under and within the limits of Section 11, will
always prove insufficient, when the City undertakes to go
in debt, as Section 12 says she may, to the full extent of five
per cent of her taxable values. (2) The concurrent expres-
sions of the members of the constitutional Convention, who
took part in the debates on the adoption of Sections 11 and
12, show that they understood Section 11 to provide taxation
for ordi:mry purposes, and Section 12 to authorize additional
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taxation to pay debts voted by the people. (3) This was the
legislative understanding of the subject: Many statutes
pa sed after the adoption of the Constitution and bWore this
case was decided, went upon the theory that the entire tax
provided by Section 11 was to be used to pay ordinary cur-
rent expenses, and that an extraordinary tax had to be levied
when debt was incurred.
In support of the first of these propositions, counsel laid
down as indisputable, two others. (a) that the power of
permitting the municipalities to incur debt is inherent in the
Legislature and is not granted by the Constitution, and that
Section 12 operates a limitation upon that power, fixing five
per cent as the limit of amount; (b) that the framers of the
Constitution must have intended that to this extent the power
should be available, whenever there was a legitimate need,
and the qualified voters by a two-thirds majority declared in
favor of incurring debt. He pointed out that in Missouri,
according to the census of 1890, there were three cities of
the first class as defined by the Constitution, three of the
second class, 129 of the third class and 100 of the fourth
class; and that Section 12 applied to all the cities of all these
different classes, the one rule of limitation of five per cent
of the taxable values; and also declared, as to all alike, that
when a debt is incurred provision shall be made for the levy
of an annual tax sufficient to pay the interest and discharge
the principal within twenty years.
He then argued that the framers of the Constitution,
in using the term "interest," must have had in mind
the rates of interest with which they were familiar.
Pointing to numerous statutes of 1875 and prior years,
he showed that the rates of interest on municipal
debts allowed by law, varied from ten per cent do-n to six
per cent, but in no case less than six; and such rates, he said,
must have been in the minds of the framers, as rates which
the municipalities would be likely to have to pay in the future.
He then showed, that since Section 12 required a sinking fund
to be provided, sufficient to pay the debt within twenty years,
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it would be necessary to collect each year, for the sinking
fund, a sum equal to five percent of the debt; so that if the
rate of interest should be ten percent, it would be necessary
to collect each year, for interest and sinking fund, an amount
equal to fifteen percent of the debt, and if the rate should
be six percent, an amount equal to eleven percent of the debt,
To show that it would not be possible for any County or town
and hardly any city in the State to incur debt to the amount
oi five per cent of its taxable values, and to pay the debt and
interest within twenty years, out of the taxes permitted by
Section 11, he constructed a table, in which he classified the
counties, cities and towns as they are classified in the Consti-
tution, selecting one of each class as a type and describing
it by the amount of its taxable property, as set out in the
column headed "Valuation." Under the head "Tax Rate"
was indicated the maximum rate leviable under Section 11, in
a municipality of that class. Under the head "Amount of
tax" was indicated the maximum amount of taxes leviable
under Section 11. Under the head "Amount of debt" was
indicated the maximum amount of debt that could be incurred
under Section 12. Under the head "Interest and Sinking
Fund" was indicated the amount that was required to be
collected each year, under Section 12, to pay these charges.
The table is as follows:
Int. 6r/ Int. 10%
Sink. Sink.
Tax Amount Amount Fund 5% Fund 5%
Counties Valuation Rate of tax of Debt Total 11% Total 15%
First Cla ...... $ 5,000,000 50c $ 25,000 $ 250,000 $ 27,500 $ 37,500
Second Class .... 8,000,000 40o 32,000 400,00 44,000 60,000
Third Class ...... 20,000,000 800 100,000 1,000,000 110,000 150,000
Fourth Class ..... 50,000,000 35c 175,000 2,500,000 275,000 275.000
CITIES
First Class ...... 100,000,000 100C 1,000,000 5,000,000 550,000 750,000
Second Class .... 10,000,000 60C 60,000 500,000 65,000 75,000
Third Class ...... 2,000,000 60c 10,000 100,000 11,000 15,000
Fourth Class ..... 200.000 25c 500 10,000 1,100 1,500
This table shows that in every municipality in the State,
except cities of the first and second classes, the total tax
leviable under Section 11, would be insufficient to pay a five
percent cebt bearing six percent interest; and that in cities
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of the first class only, would the total tax be sufficient to pay
a ,ive percent debt, bearing ten percent interest.
In other words, every county in the State, and nearly
every city, if it undertook to avail itself of its constitutional
privilege of going in debt to the extent of five percent of its
taxable values, would find itself unable to comply with the
constitutional injunction to provide a sufficient tax, if the pro-
viion had to be made out of the rate permitted by Section 11.
But this is not all. The government of the municipality
must be maintained. It is therefore obvious that the whole
tax leviable under Section 11 could not be used in the pay-
ment of the debt. If it were, Municipal Government would
go to pieces. The taxes authorized by Section 11 are intended
for ordinary current expenses; and as a rule, it is notorious,
they are not more than sufficient for that purpose.
It comes to this, then, as counsel argued: Either the whole
municipal revenue must be used to pay debt, if the municipal-
ity desired or were compelled to incur it, in which event
munic~pal government must go to pieces; or else no debt could
in ,4eneral be incurred, in which event the constitutional
guarantee in favor of creating debt up to the five percent
limit would fail. It is certain that the framers of the Con-
,;titution did not intend that either of these alternatives should
Occur.
The views of the members of the Constitution of 1875 were
ascertained by examination of the manuscript reports of the
pro(,eodings of that body. About twenty extracts were quoted,
a1nd these showed that the speakers, when discussing Section
11, had in mind only ordinary current expenses, and intended
to provide for them, but only within narrow limits. A few
allusions made to Section 12 indicated that members under-
stood that the two sections should not interfere with each
other, but the consideration of the subject of taxation to pay
debt was scant and was not enlightening.
As to the Legislation of the fifteen years following 1875,
it was shown that it all went on the assumption that no tax
lev'alle under Section 11, was intended to pay debt. An act
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of 1879, (Page 185) expressly called it "The tax for current
County Expenditures." And another act of the same year.
(Page 191) expressly directed that all such taxes should be
divided into five funds, to-wit: Pauper, Road and Bridge,
Salary, Jury and Election, and Contingent, and should be used
for these purposes and no other, leaving nothing for debt,
either previously incurred or thereafter to be incurred.
These are the views which finally prevailed.
Lamar Water Company v. City of Lamar, 128 Mo. 209.
After the question was ultimately settled, Judge Brace
once said to the writer of this paper: "You are entitled to
the credit or the discredit of having overturned the Columbia
decision. That little table of figures did the work. This was
no doubt true, and this review is written in its present form
in order to present this table. The original error of the court
was due to the fact that the judges discussed only the language
of Sections 11 and 12, and overlooked altogether the figures.
In determining the meaning of constitutional provisions,
courts rarely have to consider figures. But these sections
are unique; they bristle with figures. Argument on the
language may lead in either direction. It is the figures which
are decisive, and they leave no alternative but to adopt the
view which prevailed.
Two years later the Lamar case came up on a second
appeal, and its principle was reaffirmed, Judge Barclay saying
that the former decision ought to be taken as closing the
question. But Judges Brace, Macfarlane and Burgess adhered
to their dissent.
Lamar Water Co. v. City of Lamar, 140 Mo. 145.
In the meantime, another case had come up and been
decided by unanimous vote of Division No. 2, Judge Sherwood
delivering the opinion, and holding to the view that the tax
to pay debt was independent of the tax leviable under Section
11. Judge Burgess had a chance to adhere to his dissent, but
he seems to have overlooked it.
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Water Company v. City of Aurora, 129 Mo. 540.
Three years after the great struggle, the question came up
again, in Division No. 1, and the Lamar case was unanimously
approved, a new judge, Williams, delivering the opinion.
City of Stansberry v. Jordan, 145 Mo. 371.
Three years later still, the Court again approved the Lamar
caisc. But Judges Brace and Burgess continued their dissent.
State ex rel v. M. K. & T. R. R. Co., 164 Mo. 208.
At the same term of Court, the question was again pre-
sented and argued, but the Court refused to consider it, a
new judge, Valliant, speaking for the Court.
City of Lexington v. Lafayette County Bank, 165 Mo. 671.
The latest case affirming the doctrine is:
State cx rel v. Hackman, 275 Mo. 534.
The Columbia case was decided by Division No. 1, and the
decision was unanimous, Judge Black delivering the opinion
and Judges Barclay, Sherwood and Brace concurring. The
Lamar case was also decided by Division No. 1, upon the first
hearing, and the decision was likewise unanimous, Judge
Black again delivering the opinion, and Judges Barclay, Brace
and Macfarlane concurring. In this case, the motion for re-
hearing filed by the Water Company was overruled. Judge
Barclay, however, changed his mind and dissented and this
gave the Water Company the right to have the case trans-
ferred to the Court en banc, before the seven judges. In the
meantime, Judge Black had left the bench, and Judge Robin-
son had taken his place. The final decision was written by
Judge Barclay, with whom concurred Judges Gantt, Sherwood
an(l Robinson. Judges Brace, Macfarlane and Burgess dis-
sented.
From the foregoing recital, it will be seen that the question
at issue came up for discussion and decision, in the Supreme
Court, four times, once in the Columbia case, and three times
in the Lamar case, namely on the hearing in Division No. 1,
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on the motion for rehearing, and on the hearing en bane.
Calling the vote in favor of the proposition that the tax levi-
able under Section 11 was the only lawful tax an aye vote, the
record of the individual judges was as follows:
Judge Black-three ayes.
Judge Brace- four ayes.
Judge Macfarlane-three ayes.
Judge Burgess-two ayes.
Judge Barclay-two ayes, two nays.
Judge Sherwood-one aye, one nay.
Judge Gantt-one nay.
Judge Robinson-one nay.
This dissent was so strong that it at first seemed doubtful
whether the decision in the Lamar case would stand, and it
undoubtedly encouraged litigants to continue to fight.
For nine years, the question vexed the courts, and the
decisions are scattered through fifty-four volumes of reports.
A little care on the part of the framers of the Constitution,
as by adding a few words to Section 12, could have made the
matter plain and avoided all this trouble. May we hope that
the members of the new Constitutional Convention soon to
assemble in this State, will take warning by this example
THomAs K. SKiNKEB.
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